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Abstract
Background: From the simplest living organisms to human societies, cooperation among individuals emerges as a paradox
difficult to explain and describe mathematically, although very often observed in reality. Evolutionary game theory offers an
excellent toolbar to investigate this issue. Spatial structure has been one of the first mechanisms promoting cooperation;
however, alone it only opens a narrow window of viability.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Here we equip individuals with incipient cognitive abilities, and investigate the evolution
of cooperation in a spatial world where retaliation, forgiveness, treason and mutualism may coexist, as individuals engage in
Prisoner’s Dilemma games. In the model, individuals are able to distinguish their partners and act towards them based on
previous interactions. We show how the simplest level of cognition, alone, can lead to the emergence of cooperation.
Conclusions/Significance: Despite the incipient nature of the individuals’ cognitive abilities, cooperation emerges for
unprecedented values of the temptation to cheat, being also robust to invasion by cheaters, errors in decision making and
inaccuracy of imitation, features akin to many species, including humans.
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Introduction
Undoubtedly one of the most important legacies of Biology to
Mathematics, Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) [1,2] has been
widely employed in the study of the evolution of cooperation,
spanning a plethora of research areas which investigate this
fascinating problem. EGT introduces a population dynamical
view of Game Theory, in which one no longer needs to invoke any
rational behaviour of individuals [3]. Hence, the evolution of
cooperation can be investigated in populations of arbitrary
constituents. Recently, instances of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
game have been identified in simple organisms such as phages and
bacteria [4–6].
In the one-shot PD, each interaction involves two persons, who
can act as Cooperators (C) or Defectors (D). A C is one who
contributes a cost c to confer to the other a (larger) benefit b;
otherwise she is a Defector (D). Hence mutual cooperation confers
a net positive benefit b2c, whereas mutual defection confers
nothing to both players. Cooperating towards a D means to pay a
cost without receiving any benefit, hence ending up with a payoff
of 2c, whereas the D gets b, as she accesses the benefit at no cost.
Under the conventional assumptions of EGT – infinite well mixed
populations – cooperators always fare worse than defectors, and
natural selection will favour the latter. However, when populations
are spread in space and individuals can only interact with their
neighbours, cooperation may become evolutionary viable, as
beautifully illustrated by Nowak and May back in 1992 [7],
making use of a simplified version of the PD. This so-called spatial
reciprocity mechanism relies on the fact that unconditional players
have a limited set of fixed neighbours to interact with that allows
Cs to protect themselves from Ds by self-organizing into compact
clusters, thereby minimizing the risk of exploitation by cheaters
[7–9] (D).
Spatial reciprocity, however, provides a rather narrow window
of opportunity for cooperators to evolve under the PD, as
illustrated with the black solid line in Figure 1 (simulation methods
for the unconditional strategies are detailed in the Supporting
Information, File S1). While this result has prompted the search
for other mechanisms that may favour the emergence of
cooperation, nowhere was it taken into account that, in many
species, it will be almost impossible to imagine players to adopt an
immutable, unconditional behaviour towards all their neighbours,
however few.
Recent progresses in identifying neural correlates of behaviour,
not only in Humans [10,11] or the upper primates, but also in
other species [12], prompt one to abandon one of the pillars of
EGT: the lack of cognition of the population constituents.
Introducing (social) cognition [13,14] into EGT, however, opens
up a plethora of possibilities, very much like letting individuals
engage in repeated interactions with each other [15]. Here we
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shall equip individuals with the simplest form of social cognitive
ability. As a result, we obtain the solid blue line in Figure 1. As
soon as individuals exhibit incipient cognitive capacities, cooper-
ation blooms. In the following we show how this happens, proving
further that the result is extremely robust to errors, and that
cooperating populations are able to withstand fierce invasion
attempts from cheaters.
Results and Discussion
The lattice depicted in Figure 1 (upper graph) illustrates the
conventional population layout under spatial reciprocity, in which
individuals are located in two-dimensional space, occupying the
nodes of the lattice, interacting with those individuals they are
linked to. Spatial lattices constitute examples of regular graphs,
and our results apply qualitatively to any graph in which every
individual has the same number of neighbours (e.g. Figure 1, lower
graph). As a result, the only parameter characterizing such a graph
is the number of neighbours of each individual, which we denote
by k. Moreover, we shall further normalize the reward for mutual
cooperation making b2c = 1, thereby reducing the PD to a one-
parameter game with b.1 [16].
Let us consider myopic individuals whose only information they
manage is that resulting from their interactions. Equipping these
individuals with cognitive abilities will let them discern cooperative
from defective actions towards them, and perhaps react differently
to those actions. Since, whenever two individuals interact, they
make a simultaneous decision of what to do, then at the simplest
level, information available will correspond to the last time the two
individuals have interacted, a feature which empirical studies
suggest as reasonable [17,18]. Clearly, this is the simplest possible
level of cognition, which we denote by incipient cognition, as
opposed to other, more elaborate forms of cognition [12,19].
Because decision making is not a deterministic process [14,20], we
associate each individual interaction with a stochastic decision
process characterized by two parameters p and q. As illustrated in
Figure 2B, a (p,q) strategist will cooperate (defect) against a
neighbour with probability p (12p) if the given neighbour
cooperated with her in their previous interaction. Similarly she
cooperates (defects) with probability q (12q) if the neighbour
defected against her in the previous interaction. A similar model
was studied by Nowak and Sigmund in the framework of the two-
player iterated PD and well-mixed populations [21–26]. The
parameter p can be understood as a measure of mutualism and
(12p) as a propensity for treason. Similarly, q provides a
qualitative measure of forgiveness, whereas (12q) measures the
individual tendency to retaliate, as illustrated in Figure 2A.
Unconditional strategies correspond in this framework to extreme
cases: Unconditional cooperation to (1,1) and unconditional
defection to (0,0). It is worth noting that retaliatory strategies,
such as (1,0), resemble the famous ‘Tit for Tat’ strategy so popular
in the context of the iterated PD [27].
Figure 1. Cooperation and Cognition under spatial reciprocity. When compared to the conventional result for unconditional strategies under
spatial reciprocity (black line), inclusion of incipient cognitive abilities makes cooperation dominant even when temptation to cheat b is high (blue
line). In such cases, cooperators adopt increasingly retaliatory decisions against cheaters (q value decreases with increasing b; see main text for
details).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017939.g001
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The description above means that the players have (short term)
memory about what others did to them previously and can use this
knowledge in the process of decision making. Another important
feature of stochastic decision making is that players can take
different actions (to cooperate or to defect) against different
neighbours, even if the neighbours acted identically in the previous
interaction. Successful individuals will be imitated by their peers,
with successful (p,q) pairs spreading through the population. In
addition, every imitation process entails inherent errors of decision
and perception when strategies are assessed and eventually copied.
Errors of perception have potential relevance given that
individuals do not have direct access to the set of rules that define
the behaviour of their neighbours, but to their actions.
Consequently, the imitation process naturally contains some level
of inaccuracy.
The results shown in Figure 1 (solid blue line) correspond to
populations of size N = 10000 and k = 4, which have evolved as
described above and in Materials and Methods, starting from
players with (p,q) strategies (0ƒfp,qgƒ1) drawn randomly from a
uniform distribution.
Figure 1 shows the fraction of cooperative actions in the
population as a function of the temptation to defect b. Analysis of
the average values of p and q, in the stationary state, illustrated in
the inset, also provides interesting information. Individuals willing
to cooperate can invade the whole population by quickly creating
cooperative clusters, which allows them i) to profit from mutual
cooperative acts and ii) to defend themselves from exploiters as
they adopt low values of q. This leads to the fixation of individuals
with a high p value almost independently of the measure of the
temptation (b). Players with high p values at both ends of a link
leads to a stable cooperative link because they will most likely
cooperate subsequently after a mutual cooperative act. Thus, high
average p values constitute a good indicator of high overall
cooperation in the population. Global mutual cooperation is only
set back due to occasional defection as a result of the stochastic
nature of the decision making and of imperfect behavioural
copying. In what concerns the behaviour of the average q-value,
we observe that for low temptation b (and low value for the cost c)
the stationary q-value is rather high as an occasional defection does
not cause a big loss to the cooperative partner and fast forgiveness
pays off. In other words, mild dilemmas bring along weak selection
towards retaliation. On the contrary, for larger values of b (and c),
selection for more retaliatory behaviour increases, and low q-
values become more advantageous. These results show a lower
propensity for forgiveness than it was found in the well-mixed case
[23,28], which can be explained by the fixed connections and
harder retaliation towards neighbours. It is noteworthy that,
whenever the dilemma is strict (high b), the emergent retaliative
strategies enclose the same principles as the most successful norm
in promoting cooperation in the framework of indirect reciprocity,
where stern punishment against defectors is compensated by
prompt forgiving each time a defector turns into a cooperator [29].
Let us now investigate the robustness of cooperation to cheater
invasion. To this end we replaced, in every generation, a given
fraction of players (randomly chosen) with (0,0) strategists. The
results (for details, see File S1), show that cooperative strategies
persist even in the most adverse conditions (highest b); the prompt
reaction of players in isolating defectors renders the fitness of the
intruders far below that of their ‘cooperator’ neighbours. Hence,
defector invaders quickly resume to cooperation. It is worth to
mention that these results were obtained under an evolutionary
timescale in which individuals revise their strategy after every
interaction. This makes it harder for cooperators to identify freshly
‘‘injected’’ defectors and retaliate against free-riders, even if, as we
show, cooperation remains robust in this setting. Investigating the
effects of the different timescales on the evolution of the strategies
when the system starts from a random initial condition, i.e., not
from an established cooperative environment, is a more difficult
Figure 2. Modelling individual cognition. A) In each interaction, individuals choose simultaneously between two possible actions: to cooperate
or to defect. This choice follows a stochastic decision process characterized by two parameters p and q. While q allows individuals to retaliate or to
forgive a bad action, p defines the probability to reward a good action received in the past with another one. B) Each individual (p,q) values define
how she behaves towards her neighbours as interactions proceed along the links of a spatial lattice (regular graph), allowing individuals to adopt
different actions depending on what each neighbour did in the past.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017939.g002
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problem. It is well known that the number of game rounds
before each strategy revision may play an important role [30–32].
In this sense, our model may foster further studies concerning this
issue.
Finally, in Figure 3 we show how the emergence of cooperation
among incipient cognitive agents remains possible even when the
number of neighbours increases substantially. Naturally, with
increasing k, cooperation becomes harder to emerge, although its
demise is slow and progressive, in sharp contrast with what has
been observed with unconditional players [16]. In connection with
Figure 1, Figure 3 also uncovers a detailed interplay between
cognition and the size of the social cliques below which
cooperation remains stable, which may have an impact in the
evolution of cognition and the social brain hypothesis [33,34].
Our results provide strong evidence that cognition, even at its
most incipient level, obliterates the advantage of defectors in
spatial dilemmas of cooperation. They also prompt one to
combine population dynamics with different cognitive mecha-
nisms to unveil the complex and diverse features of animal
cooperation. Even in the absence of repeated interactions,
reputation or punishment, incipient cognition makes spatial
cooperation evolutionary viable throughout most of the parameter
space of interest for the prisoner’s dilemma. Hence, the role of
cognition in the evolution of cooperation should not be
overlooked, being it cast in terms of two-person interactions, or
in terms of group interactions.
Materials and Methods
Players are located on the nodes of a graph. The edges of the
graph define who interacts/imitates who. Individuals engage in
single-shot PD games with each of their k neighbours in each
simulation step and gain the accumulated payoff from these
interactions. Each has to make k decisions contingent on her own p
and q parameters and the particular actions of her neighbours the
last time they interacted. Computer simulations start from a
population where individuals are assigned random values of p and
q, drawn from a discretized strategy space with values p = i*0.01
and q = j*0.01 (i,j = 0,…, 100). Given the lack of information at
start, every individual cooperates with probability (p+q)/2 or
defects with probability [12(p+q)/2]. In each simulation time step,
we randomly pick two neighbouring players (x and y), and
calculate their individual payoff (fitness); player x adopts the
strategy of player y with a probability given by W (x/y)~
1
1ze Px{Pyð Þ=K
, corresponding to the so-called pairwise compar-
ison rule [35]. Px and Py are the individual fitness of players x and y
while K is associated with errors in decision making. In addition,
whenever a player decides to adopt the strategy of her neighbour,
the new strategy parameters will be px9 = py+j1(s) and
qx9 = qy+j2(s), where j1(s) and j2(s) are normally distributed
random variables with zero mean and standard deviation of s.
This feature can model a slight blur in perception and helps to
Figure 3. Robustness of cooperation with increasing neighbourhood size k. Main panel: We plot the temptation values bc below which the
fraction of cooperative actions becomes higher than 50% in the population, as a function of neighbourhood size k. Inset: We plot the average fraction
of cooperative actions as a function of the temptation to defect b for different values of connectivity k. Incipient cognitive abilities help individuals to
establish and maintain cooperation even for a very high number of neighbours. The simulations were carried out in a population of 10.000 individuals
placed on regular ring graphs (lower graph in Figure 1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017939.g003
Incipient Cognition Promotes Cooperation
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 March 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 3 | e17939
avoid the random extinction of strategies; it also ensures a
complete exploration of the strategy spectrum, given that the
pairwise comparison does not introduce new strategies in the
population.
Results in Figure 1 were obtained performing extensive
computer simulations on a square lattice (N = 1006100, illustrated
in dark blue in the inset of the same figure), employing the so-
called von Neumann (also known as Manhattan) neighbourhood
(k = 4). We imposed periodic boundary conditions and let the
system evolve for 10000 generations. Subsequently, we averaged
the particular strategy concentrations over the population during
additional 100000 generations. The K parameter of the strategy
update was chosen to be 0.4 as this value was proven to be
favourable for cooperation in the case of unconditional strategies
[36] (black curve in Figure 1). The standard deviation s associated
with errors in imitation was taken to be s = 0.005. Simulations for
Figure 3 were executed on ring-graphs of the size N = 10000 and
varying connectivity k. The equilibrium average p and q values
were obtained from averaging over 10000 generations after a
transient period of 5000 generations for 100 different random
initial conditions. The results are also independent of the type of
updating (synchronous versus asynchronous).
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